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One of the reasons for the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) is the wish to 
escape from the reach of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. Prime Minister Theresa May, in her 
January 2017 Lancaster House speech and again in her 
Florence speech of September 2017, identified the ending of 
the jurisdiction of the Court over the UK as a principal 
motivation for exiting the EU. The same significance to 
terminating the jurisdiction of the Court is given by the UK’s 
White Paper on Exit from the EU of February 2017 and the 
Bill for the Withdrawal from the EU (‘Great Repeal Bill’) of 
March 2017.  
 
Both speeches, the White Paper and the Great Repeal Bill 
highlight the prospective benefits from having ‘laws made 
in Westminster’ and ‘interpreted by UK courts’. This is 
because those who support Brexit claim that the Court is 
‘biased’ and ‘integrationist’. Bias and a tendency towards 
integration are claimed to be detected on the basis of 
judgments that run counter to alleged national interests. 
These claims are tenuous and ignore the fundamental point 
that the laws which are interpreted by the Court are made 
by the Member States themselves when they sit in the 
Council of the EU. The purpose of this policy brief is to 
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examine, first, whether the Court is particularly biased 
against the UK and, second, to ask whether, in principle, the 
alleged integrationist tendency of the Court disadvantages 
a Member State. For the purpose of detecting a bias against 
the UK, the policy brief reviews the number of 
infringements of EU law confirmed by the Court against two 
benchmarks made up by the ‘best’ performing and the 
‘worst’ performing Member States. ‘Best’ here refers to a 
Member State with the lowest number of infringements and 
‘worst’ refers to the highest number of infringements. In 
order to answer the question as to whether, in principle, 
Member States really lose out from integrationist 
judgments, a simple model is developed which leads to 
counterintuitive results. 
 
Judicial ‘bias’ as measured by infringement statistics 
 
Bias can be detected only when measured against a 
benchmark or defined standard of behaviour. This section 
does not answer the question whether in general the rulings 
of the Court of Justice reveal a tendency towards 
integrationist outcomes. Rather it examines whether the UK 
has been affected more than other Member States by the 
alleged integrationist bias of the Court of Justice.  
 
Table 1 shows the number of judicial cases to which Member 
States are parties. The three columns show the data obtained 
through the search form of the Court of Justice for three time 
periods: 1977-2017, 1987-2017, 1997-2017. The first period 
includes the UK plus the largest three founding Member 
States, which have comparable size to the UK, plus Denmark 
which acceded to the European Economic Community at the 
same time as the UK and which can function as a comparator. 
The second period includes the corresponding data for the 
Southern Member States, Greece, Portugal and Spain. The 
third period includes also Finland that acceded in 1995. As will 
be explained later on, Denmark and Finland are the ‘best’ 
performing Member States in terms of having the lowest the 
Executive Summary 
> In comparison to other Member States, the UK has 
been involved in fewer court cases. 
> There are fewer infringement cases initiated by the 
European Commission against the UK. 
> The UK benefits from judgments of the Court of 
Justice that pry open other markets. 
> “Taking back control” means losing the support of 
the Court of Justice in keeping markets open. 
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number of declared infringements of EU law in the 21-year 
period 1995-2016. 
 
Table 1: Member States party to judicial proceedings 
 1977-2017 1987-2017 1997-2017 
UK 212 189 150 
    
Italy 864 757 533 
France 692 619 491 
Germany 503 467 380 
Denmark 58 49 33 
    
Greece  501 363 
Spain  462 387 
Portugal  261 240 
    
Finland   76 
 
The data in Table 1 should be treated with caution. They do 
not always concern infringement of EU law. They may also 
refer to other types of disputes such as when a Member State 
takes action against a Council or Commission act. With this 
qualification in mind, it is obvious from Table 1 that the UK 
has not been involved in more cases than other Member 
States of comparable size. In fact, if the number of 
infringements is thought to be related to the size of the 
economy, rather surprisingly, the UK has also been involved 
in significantly fewer cases than the Southern Member States 
which are smaller in size. However, the numbers for the UK 
far exceed those of Denmark and Finland for the 
corresponding time periods. Hence, the conclusion must be 
that the UK has fared much better than other Member States 
of comparable size and also better than several other 
Member States of smaller size.  
 
Admittedly, the raw data in Table 1 also reflects, first, the 
propensity of a Member State to comply with or ignore EU 
law, second, the administrative capacity of the country to 
implement EU law and, third, the willingness of the country 
to challenge EU acts. The UK is generally perceived to be 
legally compliant (resulting in fewer cases before the Court), 
it has a strong and capable administrative system (which also 
results in fewer cases), but it has also not hesitated to 
challenge EU acts which it perceived to encroach on national 
prerogatives (which leads to a higher number of cases). But 
whatever the reason behind the statistics, the UK has been 
involved in fewer cases before the Court of Justice than other 
Member States. 
 
The statistics of the Court of Justice only on infringements 
show that the UK actually occupies the ninth position within 
the EU (see Table 2). Although the statistics recorded by the 
Court start in 1952, there were very few cases in the 1950s 
and only a small number in the 1960s. Despite the fact that 
the UK acceded to the EEC/EU in 1973, fewer proceedings 
have been initiated against it than against Greece, Ireland or 
Portugal. 
 
Table 2: Number of infringement proceedings, 1952-2016 
Member State Number of infringement proceedings 
Italy 643 
France 417 
Greece 404 
Belgium 384 
Germany 283 
Luxembourg 267 
Ireland 206 
Portugal 205 
UK 141 
 
Perhaps what critics of the Court mean by integrationist bias 
is that the Court tends to find that national measures infringe 
on EU rules. This is true. Table 3 shows the number of 
infringement cases opened each year, the number of cases 
concluded with a judgment and the number of judgments 
that confirm infringement for the period 2002-2016. More 
than 90% of judgments find infringement. 
 
However, it is important to understand that the proceedings 
before the Court are not necessarily representative of the 
actual situation in each Member State. Infringement 
proceedings are initiated by the Commission. Hardly ever is a 
case brought by a Member State against another Member 
State. Of the hundreds of files opened each year by the 
Commission, only very few, about five to ten percent, end up 
before the Court of Justice. The vast majority of files are 
closed before the case reaches the Court. To some extent 
these numbers also reflect the willingness or unwillingness of 
Member States to accept the view of the Commission. 
 
In addition, the Commission has discretion to choose the 
cases it wants to pursue before the Court. Naturally, it 
chooses those it believes it can win or those for which it wants 
a ruling to clarify important issues over which Member States 
hold conflicting views. Hence, the cases which are lodged 
with the Court are not a random sample of all possible 
disputed issues. 
 
Furthermore, not all infringements are of the same 
importance, nor do they have the same impact on national 
economies and policies or the internal EU market. For 
example, restrictions on establishment can have a significant 
restrictive effect. By contrast, the effect of failure to record a 
certain statistic or to provide adequate protection to an 
indigenous species is unlikely to impede the functioning of 
the internal market. Nonetheless, they are also classified as 
infringements of EU law and are counted towards the data in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3: Infringement cases [opened and closed], 2002-2016 
Year Cases 
opened 
Judgments Infringement 
found (% of 
judgments) 
2016 31 31 27 (87%) 
2015 37 31 26 (84%) 
2014 57 44 41 (93%) 
2013 54 63 40 (64%) 
2012 58 52 47 (90%) 
2011 73 81 72 (89%) 
2010 128 95 83 (87%) 
2009 142 141 133 (95%) 
2008 207 103 94 (91%) 
2007 212 143 127 (89%) 
2006 193 111 103 (93%) 
2005 170 136 131 (96%) 
2004 193 155 144 (93%) 
2003 214 86 77 (90%) 
2002 168 93 90 (97%) 
NB: The starting year is 2002 because earlier reports of the 
Court of Justice do not provide the same data. 
 
Even assuming that the Court of Justice has a pronounced 
tendency to find infringement of EU law, which implicitly 
assumes that the standard for detecting bias is that the share 
of judgments finding infringement should not be higher than 
50 percent, the UK has not been the Member State with the 
worst record in terms of infringements. 
 
The data in Table 3 shows a significant decline in the number 
of cases over the last six years. This can be interpreted as the 
result of Member States becoming more compliant. 
However, there can also be alternative explanations. Perhaps 
the efforts of the Commission to resolve issues at the pre-
litigation stage are more successful. Indeed the annual 
reports of the Commission on the implementation of EU law 
indicate that the large majority of cases are resolved at the 
stage of ‘letter of first notice’ or of the ‘reasoned opinion’. It 
may also be that the network of SOLVIT centres and ‘pilot’ 
scheme are effective in persuading Member States to adjust 
their laws and policies before a case reaches the Court of 
Justice. 
 
Table 4 shows the ‘worst’ and ‘best’ performing Member 
States, as measured by the number of cases initiated by the 
Commission against them. It also shows the number of cases 
which are ‘won’ by the Member States when the Court 
dismisses the action brought against them by the 
Commission. 
 
Table 4: Infringements per Member State [‘best/worst’ 
Member State], 1995-2016 
 Finding of 
infringement 
(wholly or partially) 
Dismissed 
(‘won’ by  
Member State) 
Finland 11 4 (27%) 
Denmark 11 1 (8%) 
   
UK 61 12 (16%) 
   
France 123 13 (10%) 
Italy 207 10 (5%) 
 
Again the UK is neither the worst, nor the best Member State. 
It occupies a middle position. More interestingly, in 
comparison to the Member States in the table, the UK has 
won more cases in relative terms with the exception of 
Finland and more cases in absolute terms with the exception 
of France. 
 
These statistics do not measure the magnitude of the benefits 
or costs of each Member State from the judgments of the 
Court of Justice. The numbers by themselves cannot prove 
that the UK has ‘suffered’ more or less than other Member 
States. However, the numbers do indicate that the UK has not 
been involved in more cases than the other large Member 
States, nor has it had more cases initiated against it. In 
conclusion, the actions of the Court of Justice do not seem to 
have had a disproportionate impact on the UK. 
 
Does integrationist bias necessarily harm national interests? 
 
The recent speeches of the UK Prime Minister, the White 
Paper and the Great Repeal Bill and, of course, the numerous 
statements of Brexiteers explicitly and implicitly assume that 
it is unequivocally in the interest of the UK that the laws that 
apply to the country are those made in Parliament in 
Westminster and enforced by UK courts. The logical 
weakness of this view is that it ignores the benefits that can 
be derived from the ability to influence other countries’ laws 
and policies through the Council of the EU. To put it 
differently, the UK is in the process of exiting the EU in order 
to regain control over its laws and policies. But the 
concomitant consequence of ‘taking back control’ over its 
own laws is losing control over others’ laws and policies and 
over issues that transcend national borders such as pollution, 
tax evasion or organised crime. One may have credible 
arguments that in practice the benefits from gaining control 
will outweigh the costs of losing control. But it is certainly not 
true, either logically or empirically, that gaining control will 
unambiguously make the UK better off. The loss of control 
must be factored into the equation. 
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A country may exercise a degree of control over another 
country’s laws and policies not only by influencing them at 
the policy formulation stage, but also by preventing practices 
which are harmful to its interests and which contravene 
agreed principles. It is at this stage that adjudication or 
dispute resolution play a significant role. Just like loss of 
control is the flip side of gaining control, a court’s judgment 
on another country’s practices is the flip side of that court’s 
judgment on one’s own practices. 
 
The UK may bemoan what it perceives as an intrusion in its 
domestic legal system, but whenever the Court finds an 
infringement it opens up even slightly more the market of 
other Member States or aligns even more closely other 
Member States’ policies and practice to agreed norms. Both 
of these effects, reduction in barriers and alignment of 
policies, enable the internal market to function more 
smoothly. The UK, as a major exporting country, certainly 
benefits from these outcomes even when such benefits are 
not recorded or perceived to be flowing from the judgments 
of the Court. Therefore, the alleged integrationist bias of the 
Court must make the UK better off by prying open other 
markets and by enabling, as a result, UK firms to export to 
and establish commercial presence in other Member States. 
 
To see more rigorously why integrationist bias does not 
necessarily harm national interests, consider the following 
simple model. Assume that the judgments of the Court can 
lead to two outcomes: a pro-integration outcome and an 
outcome that confirms national measures. The implication of 
this assumption is that the model which is developed below 
fits more in the context of the internal market than in other 
areas of EU law that may not have the same market-opening 
effect. The integrationist bias is captured by the fact that the 
probability of the pro-integration outcome, ‘a’, is greater 
than the probability of the outcome that confirms the 
national measure, ‘b’. Since there are only two mutually 
exclusive outcomes it necessarily follows that a + b = 1 and 
that b = (1 – a). Given that a > b, it also follows that a > 0.5. 
 
Further assume that the effects from the pro-integration 
outcome are considered by any Member State to have a value 
of E and the effects of the confirmation of national measures 
to have a value of N. Because E is perceived to be a cost to 
the country, the net impact of a judgment is captured by the 
formula (1 – a)N – aE. If N = E, then it follows that the country 
loses out from a pro-integration judgment because (1 – a)N – 
aE < 0. But it is not necessary to assume that the values of E 
and N are the same. 
 
Let us further assume that (i) we have a union of ‘n’ Member 
States of similar size, that (ii) in each year all Member States 
are involved in a case before the Court and that (iii) the size 
of the effects of Court judgments on each Member State is 
the same. This of course is not true in reality. But this is to 
represent the worst-case scenario, given the fact that, as 
seen above, the UK is involved in fewer cases than other 
Member States. 
 
Now each year, the full impact of Court rulings on the EU as a 
whole is given by the formula 
[N (number of Member States) x a (probability of 
pro-integration outcome) x E (effects from pro-
integration outcome)] – [n (number of Member 
States) x (1 – a) (probability of pro-member state 
outcome) x N (effects from confirmation of 
national measures)].  
 
It is important to understand the change in signs. Whereas for 
each Member State individually a court judgement leading to 
E is negative because it opens up its market or forces it to 
change policy, such a judgement is positive for all other 
Member States. The opposite holds for N. The gains of each 
Member State individually correspond to losses for other 
Member States. Moreover, given the assumption that the 
effects are the same for all Member States and all Member 
States have equivalent size, it follows that the share of the 
gains and losses experienced from each judgment by all other 
Member State is derived by dividing the total effects by (n – 
1) which is the number of Member States minus the one 
directly involved in the judgment. 
 
Therefore, the net effect experienced by each Member State 
is the sum of the effects of the judgment that concerns it 
directly and the effects of the judgments for all other 
Member States, that is: 
[(1 – a)N – aE] + [(n – 1)aE/(n – 1) – (n – 1)(1 – 
a)N/(n – 1)] = 0. 
 
This result demonstrates that regardless of the supposed bias 
of the Court, the overall effect, when taking into account the 
effects from the opening up of all other markets, is zero. Since 
the Court of Justice has not shown any specific bias against 
the UK, the integrationist tendency of the Court in general 
has not harmed UK interests. 
 
Let us then consider the effects on a country which, like the 
UK, is involved in fewer court cases than the other large 
Member States. It is necessary to consider what such effects 
may be because the larger Member States due to the size of 
their economies are the natural destination of the majority of 
exports of the other Member States. 
 
Let ‘m’ be the number of cases and that m > n. There are more 
cases than Member States which means that some Member 
States are involved in more than one case each year. We still 
presume that the Member State we examine is involved only 
in one case per year. 
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The total effect on that country is now: 
[(1 – a)N – aE] + [maE/(n – 1) – m(1 – a)N/(n – 1)], 
By rearranging, we derive 
[(n – 1)(1 – a)N – (n – 1)aE] + [maE – m(1 – 
a)N]/(n – 1), 
Or,  
[nN – naN – N + aN – naE + aE + maE – mN + 
maN]/(n – 1). 
 
The expression above gives the total effect. It follows that a 
Member State experiences net positive effects when that 
expression is greater than zero, i.e. 
[nN – naN – N + aN – naE + aE + maE – mN + 
maN]/(n – 1) > 0. 
 
Given that the denominator is positive [(n – 1) > 0], the whole 
expression is positive when the numerator is also positive. 
Since it is assumed that n > 1 and that m > n, it follows that 
the pairs (nN – N), (maN – naN), (maE – naE), (aN + aE) have 
all positive values. But (– mN) has a negative value. This 
means that a Member State experiences  a net positive effect 
when 
(nN – N) + (maN – naN) + (maE – naE) + (aN + aE) – 
mN > 0, 
or (nN – N) + (maN – naN) + (maE – naE) + (aN + aE) 
> mN. 
 
The outcome of the inequality above is indeterminate. It 
depends on the values of E, N, a, n and m. 
 
But, let us see what happens when the alleged integrationist 
bias of the Court is at its limit. In formal terms, this means 
that probability ‘a’ becomes 1. We can now re-write the 
inequality above as 
nN – N + mN – nN + mE – nE + N + E > mN, 
 
By simplifying, 
mE – nE + E > 0, 
which means that 
E(m – n + 1) > 0 
 
The last expression is true because m > n, regardless of the 
size of ‘E’! Moreover, the larger the number of cases ‘m’ 
brought against other countries, the larger the beneficial 
effect experienced by a pro-market Member State. 
 
This is an important result. If other Member States do not 
apply agreed principles and rules correctly, then a pro-
market, pro-trade, pro-investment country like the UK 
certainly benefits from a pro-integrationist bias by the Court 
of Justice. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This policy brief has sought to demonstrate that, first, the UK 
has not been embroiled in more proceedings before the 
Court of Justice than other large Member States. Second, 
actually fewer proceedings have been initiated against it by 
the Commission than against other large or medium-size 
members. Third, it has won relatively more cases than other 
large Member States. 
 
The policy brief has also shown that in principle, judicial bias 
towards integration is not necessarily harmful to the interests 
of a relatively open economy like that of the UK. This is 
because such an integrationist tendency would pry open 
other markets which would be beneficial to firms of such an 
open economy. 
 
Therefore, for the UK at least, escaping from the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice is not a good reason to leave the EU. 
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